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centrally planned economies in CEE and FSU. These policies were expected to 
lead to improvements in welfare. Studies on the transition projected initial falls 
in inequality and increases in poverty, which are confirmed here. This paper 
examines to what extent effects to overall welfare can be discerned from the 
data in a highly rural economy in a Republic in the FSU. The analysis uses 
Kyrgyz household survey data for 1993 and 1996. 
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1 Introduction
Kyrgyzstan became an independent state in August 1991. In common with other ex-Soviet
republics the Republic embarked on a transition path away from a command economy and
pursued what was claimed to be a rapid programme of reform (E.B.R.D. (1995)). Since
the beginning of the 1990s the economic and political reforms taking place in the Kyrgyz
Republic have resulted in a relatively protracted recession that has had a severe impact
on livelihoods. Households had to cope with price liberalization of basic staple goods,
contraction in the labour market and falling real wages and incomes, when wages and
benefits were actually received, and inflation levels that peaked at triple digits by 1993.
Despite these outcomes the reforms are expected to lead eventually to a marked rise in
national incomes and improvements in living standards though it is not known how long
this will take given the extent of the recession.
The aim of this paper is to provide an indication of the extent of the recovery in living
standards over the period 1993-1996. Although inequality and poverty indices from other
studies are consistent with findings in this paper, namely that inequality has fallen slightly
while poverty has increased over the period 1993 to 1996, this analysis is a much more
detailed comparison of welfare over 1993 and 1996 and provides a better understanding
of the magnitude of the impact of the reform process on the population over this period.
This paper provides a picture of the extent of the upheavals caused by the reform process
to the welfare of the Kyrgyz population and assesses whether it can be concluded that
there have been improvements in welfare over the transitional period 1993-1996.
There is evidence from a range of studies, see U.N.D.P. (1999), Falkingham et al.
(1996), Cox, Jimenez, and Jordan (1995), E.B.R.D. (1995), Ko Styukova (1994), Howell
(1994) and Dabrowski et al. (1995), that the greatest shocks to the economy occurred
in the earlier years of reform. Other studies have focussed on inequality and poverty
comparisons across countries, see U.N.D.P. (1999), Flemming and Micklewright (1999),
Milanovic (1998), Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and World Bank (2000). Milanovic
(1998) presents a comprehensive study comparing inequality and poverty rates across
countries of the FSU and CEE, often using income data from the FBS for the late 1980s
and comparing with more recent data when available. In general republics of the CEE
have lower income inequality and lower poverty rates compared to the FSU. Other national
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reports, such as that by the Kyrgyz Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, M.L.S.P.
(1998) and Mudahar (1998), detail the existing problems and how poverty has exacerbated
as a result of the reforms. Recent studies focusing on the Kyrgyz Republic have looked at
the incidence of poverty at single points in time, such as Ackland and Falkingham (1996)
and World Bank (1995) for the Fall of 1993, World Bank (1997) for Spring 1996 and
NatKomStat (1997) for Fall 1996. Milanovic (1998) compares 1987/8 and 1993 figures. As
well as the incidence of poverty there have been several studies looking at the correlates
of poverty, such as Ackland and Falkingham (1996) who use probit analysis applied to
Fall 1993 data, and Anderson and Pomfret (1999) who use a quantile regression approach
comparing Fall 1993 and 1996. Ackland and Falkingham (1996) find some gender bias
to poverty using the 1993 data, with female headed households in urban areas having a
higher incidence of poverty. They found little evidence of the number of children making a
diﬀerence to poverty incidences. The results in Anderson and Pomfret (1999) diﬀer slightly
and the authors find that the cost of children has increased, hence making families with
children more likely to be in poverty compared to 1993. They also found that the south
seems to be worse oﬀ than the north and household heads with post-secondary school
training appear to be doing better. Anderson and Pomfret (1999) claim that poverty has
stabilized over the period 1993 and 1996 while the determinants of poverty have changed.
Here, on the contrary, it is argued that since there has been only a gradual improvement
in the economy, with substantial changes to employment and unemployment occurring
over this period, the determinants of poverty are unlikely to have altered greatly. Hence
the focus in this paper is on the extent of the changes in welfare over this period.
The paper is structured as follows; the first section provides an overview of the eﬀects
of the reforms that were introduced. In the next section a background to inequality and
poverty since the Soviet period is provided to give a context for the findings in the Kyrgyz
Republic. The methodological approach used for this analysis is then described, followed
by a description of the data used in the empirical analysis. The findings for welfare are
then presented for 1993 and 1996, ending with a conclusion of these results.
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2 Overview of the aﬀects of reforms on welfare
The Kyrgyz Republic is a small land-locked mountainous country of approximately 4.6m
people. The Republic is one of the poorest and less developed out of the five Republics
in Central Asia. Unlike Russia, little is known about the aﬀects of reform in Central Asia
and this paper aims to provide an understanding of the process of reform in a highly rural
economy such as the Kyrgyz Republic. The relative success of the implementation of these
reforms is noted elsewhere, see E.B.R.D. (1997), E.B.R.D. (1998) and Jermakowicz and
Pankow (1994), but in general the Kyrgyz Republic did not fare particularly badly in
terms of eﬀectiveness compared to other countries going through similar changes.
The aﬀects of the breakup of the Soviet Union on the Kyrgyz Republic included the
loss of an integrated trading market and cross-country subsidies, particularly from Moscow
(transfers from Moscow accounted for as much as 10% of GDP till 1991, see The World
Bank (1993)), and the collapse of a highly specialized integrated production system that
spanned Republics within the Union (see Rumer (1989) and Rutkowski (1996)). The Kyr-
gyz Republic with no natural resources, and hence with little obvious economic potential
for growth, separated from a union that permitted it an economic and political viability
that would appear to be diﬃcult for it to sustain on its own (see Slem (1997) for the
economic implications of the break-up of the Soviet Union into 15 independent Sates).
In fact by the mid-1990s the Kyrgyz Republic had one of the more favourable invest-
ment climates in the region. The country had a stable currency, the Som, introduced in
May 1993, and a stock exchange, the only privately-owned one in the region. Foreign
investment was still relatively limited, though notable among these were joint ventures
with firms established in the early 1990s to explore and develop newly found gold reserves
at the Kumtor mine, around Lake Issy-Kul. Price liberalization took place in two stages,
in April 1991 and in January 1992, where price controls were removed on all goods except
a limited list of items. Inflation peaked at 1,363% in 1993, gradually stabilizing to around
35% in 1996. The Kyrgyz Republic experienced falls in GDP of 20% with only positive
rates of growth emerging in late 1995, see Table 1.
Reduction in Government expenditure also meant that the relatively generous social
assistance system that was a feature of many Soviet economies has been greatly reduced.
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Table 1: Economic Indicators 1992-1997
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Output, percentage change
GDP constant prices −19.0 −16.0 −20.0 −5.4 7.1 9.9
Industrial gross output −26.4 −25.3 −23.5 −36.9 3.9 39.7
Agricultural gross output −5.0 −10.0 −15.0 4.0 0.9 3.0
Gross average monthly wages in Soms (annual average)
Nominal wages* 11.5 83.8 233.4 368.2 490.9 680.2
Real wages* 10.4 83.4 71.0 73.5 75.1 82.9
Percentage Change (based on end year)
Consumer Prices 1, 259 1, 363 95.7 32.3 34.9 14.7
Producer Prices na 224.6 96.7 17.0 23.0 26.0
Soms per US dollar (annual average)
Exchange rate 226.2 6.1 10.8 10.8 12.8 17.4
Source: EBRD (2000), *E.B.R.D. (1998) and E.B.R.D. (1997)
The high inflation withered the value of benefits such as pensions and child benefits.
Many other areas were aﬀected by reductions in Government expenditure, in particular
health and education. Medical services and schooling that was relatively free before reform
became subjected to fees and unoﬃcial charges.
During the early years of reform arrears in both wages and benefit payment were
high. Even when paid, wages and other kinds of income received by the majority of the
population were not suﬃcient to satisfy minimum basic needs, see M.L.S.P. (1998). Real
wages fell by over half in 1992 due to inflation levels and their average level is lower than
that of the minimum consumer budget, see Table 2.
The reduction in the Government budget meant a change from the array of univer-
sal benefits households could claim and means-testing was used to allocate the limited
funds, see Neubourg and Morris (1999). Means-tested benefits were also low and paid to
low income families up to the rate of the minimum wage per family member and were
insuﬃcient to prevent people falling into poverty. This was compounded with problems of
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Table 2: Falls in Real Incomes, 1992-1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Fall in Income since 1991* 60% 8.2% 21.8% 11.3% 1.8%
* minus taxes and compulsory payments
Source: Kyrgyz Republic Social Policy 1998, M.L.S.P. (1998)
delays in payment and poor targeting of eligible households. However by the mid 1990s,
the Government was making attempts to target more eﬀectively its limited budget.
In particular, the economic crisis had a severe impact on agricultural production and
the economy of villages. The agrarian sector was deprived of State subsidies and prefer-
ential credits. Peasant farms faced sharp increases in the price for equipment, fertilizers,
electric power carriers and the sale of their own products. In some parts of the country,
farmers’ wages had not been paid for some years, see Mudahar (1998).
There was further commercialization of education, public health, housing and com-
munal services. The eﬀect of higher costs of education led to a significant proportion
of the population excluded from acquiring knowledge and hence from entering certain
professions.
Several national strategies were implemented from the late 1996 onwards, in order to
address the growing incidence of poverty. These were included in the National Strategy of
Development, which was designed to run till 2005; Indicative Plan of the socio-economic
development 1996-1998, National Strategy of sustainable Human Development till 2015
main aim intended to reduce poverty by 10%, see Kaiser et al. (1996). Against this
background of reform the aﬀects of the restructuring process are examined for the Kyrgyz
Republic over the transitional period 1993-1996.
3 Background to Soviet Inequality and Poverty
Here we provide a context for the importance of inequality and poverty concepts in the
FSU.
Although it was assumed by many that prior to reform Communist countries would
enjoy more egalitarian distributions of income than market economies, there were in fact no
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ideological foundations for such objectives. According to Marx’s principles of distribution
there were two successive stages of development; socialism and then communism. Once
problems of production were solved and incentive issues were no longer a hindrance, under
communism individuals were to be rewarded according to need. However, until obstacles of
production were resolved under socialism individuals’ would be rewarded largely according
to their contribution. Although known as Communist countries principles of socialism were
followed with the true form of communism rarely ever being attained. The main feature of
socialist countries was the ownership of the means of production by the State. Although
there was a variety of forms of ownership, for example social ownership or collective
ownership amongst others, the role of the State was of foremost importance. Not only
was the State a major employer but through the places of work individuals received health
and education facilities, pensions and other social benefits.
For those outside of the labour market, socialist economies did not provide social as-
sistance programmes. The use of enterprises to provide social protection meant that those
who were only weakly (or less than weakly) connected with the labour market often fell
through the safety net. Some sort of substitute safety net was often provided by family,
friends and neighbours. Shlapentokh (1989) claimed that around two-thirds of working
parents in the Soviet Union and more than a quarter of Soviet households regularly bor-
rowed money from each other. The regularity and extent of these transactions also reflect
the absence of commercial credit institutions from whom loans could be obtained. Pri-
vate or ‘inter-household’ transfers can significantly change consumption possibilities, as
has been shown in Townsend (1994), where eﬀects of ‘inter-household’ transfers on house-
hold consumption in India were examined. Interestingly, there is little evidence in the
literature of the presences of private commercial money lenders or pawnbrokers in Central
Asia. McAuley and Coudouel (1996) note that both cultural (for example, the strong
clan loyalties) and religious (Islam emphasizes the desirability of alms-giving and family
solidarity) factors in society in the Kyrgyz Republic and Central Asia in general make the
study of private transfers particularly interesting and given the inherited Soviet structure,
strengthens the expectations about the importance of private transfers. It is anticipated
that these informal coping strategies are likely to become more significant during the
early stages of transition. McAuley and Coudouel (1996) have examined whether the in-
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troduction of public schemes ‘crowd out’ private provision in Central Asia. Households
previously supplying private transfers to the less well-oﬀ may cut back on their supply
leading to little net increase in the incomes of the poor. This is unlikely to have happened
by the mid-1990s. There is evidence from preliminary analysis of the data that such trans-
fers are prevalent, though evidence has suggested that at certain times, e.g. high inflation
periods, such transfers were reduced. The assessment of such ‘gifts’ is also problematic
when they are in the form of non-monetary ‘gifts’, e.g. agricultural produce or durables,
since they need to be valued for comparison purposes. Earlier studies have however found
that private transfers have been large and widespread during the transition over the pe-
riod 1994-1996 in Russia. Contributions of private transfers to household income were
found to be on average 8% of total income, see Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1997). In fact, in
cultures with the extended family structure, such as in Central Asian Republics, transfers
are likely to be more intra-household rather than inter-household transfers, making it even
more diﬃcult to distinguish such transfers for accounting purposes. Such transfers as well
as improving living standards may reduce inequality, particularly for households at the
lower end of the distribution who are likely to be the recipients of transfers.
Despite equality of outcome not being the main objective, the consequence of the
abolition of private ownership of production did in fact do much to reduce inequality. In
addition interventions by Central Planners in setting wages and prices in order to limit
large wage dispersions, particularly in the USSR, led to lower inequality in the earnings
distribution. As a result in general the income distribution was found to be relatively
more egalitarian in socialist countries than non-socialist countries partly due to the non-
monetary fringe benefits and the greater amount of social transfers, detailed below. With
the movement away from socialism to a market economy the ex-socialist countries are
expected to converge to the level of market economies.
Prior to the reform, household survey data in many of the socialist countries took the
form of Family Budget Surveys (FBS), which began in the 1870s. The lack of availability
of the data for former socialist countries had resulted in limited empirical studies being
carried out. When data were available, there were often problems of reliability and even
more so comparability with non-socialist countries. The FBS focussed on the working pop-
ulation and excluded vulnerable groups of the population in particular the unemployed or
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pensioners, see Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and Milanovic (1998) for comments on
comparability and problems with the survey data. Recently implemented measurement
tools in the form of nationally representative household surveys, such as the Living Stan-
dard Measurement survey introduced by the World Bank in many of these countries, have
facilitated much empirical analysis subsequent to reform including this thesis. However,
even with LSMS data, the widespread use of non-monetary fringe benefits, subsidies and
in-kind payments in ex-socialist countries can make comparisons with market economies
problematic.
3.1 Inequality in the Former Soviet Union
Studies show that in the 1950’s there were large regional disparities in the distribution
of income within the Soviet Union and this persisted in the 1960’s and 1970’, see Lydall
(1968), Pryor (1973) and Wiles (1974)1. The USSR was found to be more unequal that
Hungary, though less unequal than the USA and Western Europe in general. Other
studies support the view that the distribution of earnings was significantly less unequal
in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe than in comparable Western countries, see
Lydall (1979), Chapman (1979) and Bergson (1984). By the 1980s, studies comparing
Western and Soviet economies found little systematic diﬀerence on overall dispersion of
earnings. Results from Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) (pg. 80 their reference) confirm
that little had changed by the mid 1980s with the Soviet Union having distinctly greater
dispersion in their earning distribution with the ratio of top and bottom decile for USSR
reaching 3.3, higher than for the Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Poland.
Inequality within the USSR had increased over the 1980s, despite showing a marked
reduction over the late 1990s, see Redor (1986) (using a translation of the main findings)
and McAuley (1991). There was, and is, a significant disparity in the size of the Republics
of the FSU. In 1989 Russia represented 55% of employed in the USSR. Average earnings
varied as a percentage of those in Russia, from 69% in Azerbaidzhan and 73% in Moldova
to 104% Estonia. Over time there has been a distinct rise in average earnings relative to
1Labour income was found to represent a much larger proportion of total household income in the FSU
than in CEE Republics - over 70% for the former and just over 50% for the latter - so trends in the earnings
distribution for Republics of the FSU can be relatively informative of trends in overall household income
for these countries, see Milanovic (1998).
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Russia in the 1960s.
There is now substantially more information on low incomes in the FSU than was previ-
ously available, see McAuley (1979) and Matthews (1986). Central Asian Republics tended
to have lower incomes and expenditures than the overall average for USSR. Although pri-
vate plot production in agriculture was permitted, this source of private income tended to
be larger for those at the bottom of the distribution. Flemming and Micklewright (1999)
look at inequality across an extensive list of Central and Eastern European, Baltic and
FSU Republics for 1989, (their reference pg. 29, is based on a table taken from Atkinson
and Micklewright (1992) and other sources). The Gini coeﬃcient for the Kyrgyz Republic,
and in fact all Central Asian Republics, in 1989 for the distribution of per capita income
was 27, higher than Eastern Europe and the Baltic States by about 4 to 5 percentage
points. Milanovic (1998) estimates a similar figure for 1989 but using 1993 data, the Gini
coeﬃcient for per capita income increased to 55 (a quarterly figure) while for per capita
expenditure he reports a figure of 43. These figures for the distribution of expenditure are
comparable with those found in this study for the Kyrgyz Republic though here 1993 and
1996 expenditure figures are compared.
3.2 Poverty in the Former Soviet Union
The eradication of poverty was seen as a distinguishing feature between socialism and
capitalism, with the former supposedly concentrating more on reducing poverty than the
latter. Poverty was a sensitive subject and treated in a diﬀerent light to inequality and
in fact those in poverty were referred to as ‘maloobespechennye’ or the under-provisioned.
Although discussion of the subject was not encouraged, there has been a long tradition
of work on subsistence minima in the USSR, though it had its drawbacks in terms of
under-representation of the population concentrating on those belonging to an enterprise
in urban areas. Despite this, calculations were published by Sarkisyan and Kuznetsova
(1967) and many subsequent studies by other authors, including Rimashevskaia (1990),
are based on their original calculations. The former authors produced subsistence minima
for an urban family of four (two working adults and two children) in 1957. However there
were drawbacks to using the figures as a general benchmark since they failed to incorporate
the higher prices paid by collective workers, did not include medical, health expenditure
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nor housing (provided by the State) costs, and allowed for only a low provision for alcohol
and tobacco. Despite these caveats, a third of the population was found to fall below a
cut oﬀ of 51.4 Rubles per month per capita, see Matthews (1986). As noted by Matthews,
the proportion would be larger for disadvantaged workers, such as low-grade workers and
the rural peasant population working in collectives.
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) look at more recent findings. In 1989, using a 1988
poverty line, Goskomstat estimated poverty in the USSR to be 14% of the population. A
national minimum of 81-88 Rubles per month per capita calculated by Goskomstat in 1989
was found to fall within the 75-100 Ruble interval of the income distribution of the USSR.
Based on the lower band, the authors calculate poverty rates across the USSR using a
nation-wide poverty cut oﬀ of 75 Rubles per capita per month. Taking the union as a
whole, 11% of the 31 million people were found to be in poverty in 1989. The authors found
significant variation across the Republics. The Baltic Republics had the lowest incidence
of poverty in 1989, ranging between 1.9% in Estonia to 2.4% in Lithuania. The Republics
of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova too had relatively low levels, 3.3% in Belarus
to 6% in Ukraine. Moldova had a higher level, roughly 12% similar to the Transcaucasia
Republics of Georgia and Armenia. In Azerbaijan the incidence of poverty (a third of
the population) was similar to those found in Central Asia, where poverty ranged from a
third to over half the population. It was as much as 43.6% in Uzbekistan and over 50%
in Tajikistan while the figure for the Kyrgyz Republic was 32.9%. Russia, with half the
population of the Union, had slightly less than a quarter of the poor, see Table 8.4 pg. 241
in Atkinson and Micklewright (1992). The five Central Asian Republics contain just over
half of the poor yet make up only 17% of the population. Though diﬀerences in prices
and family sizes were not taken into consideration the figures still reflect the lower living
standards, particularly in Central Asia. The authors also illustrate diﬀerences within
Republics, by distinguishing collective farm households from worker/employee households
with the former on a lower income.
So in general Central Asian Republics experienced greater disparity and poverty com-
pared to other Republics in FSU, though the USSR was found to be less unequal then
Western countries. Given this background we examine changes between 1993 and 1996.
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4 Methodology for Welfare Measurement
Deprivation in ‘income space’ spans a wide range of measurement tools. The tools applied
in this analysis are based on those found in Cowell (1995) and Cowell (2000), which
provides a more detailed explanation of theoretical and empirical application of techniques
of income distribution than is explained here.
4.1 Welfare Rankings
Comparisons of welfare between 1993 and 1996 are carried out using a carefully defined
social welfare function. The function incorporates desirable properties2 that allow dis-
tributions to be ordered with meaningful outcomes. There are several tests that can be
applied to see if there has been an improvement in welfare between the years.
The first test, first-order dominance test, states that if the quantile functional (the
proportion of total income received by a proportion of the population) of two income
distributions, which in this analysis are the two years 1993 and 1996, can be unequivocally
ranked it can be concluded that welfare in one year is greater than in the other year. This
test often does not provide inconclusive results and a second test is applied. It is important
to note that the first-order dominance test does not incorporate the principle of transfers3.
If it is believed that this is a desirable attribute of changes in social welfare (as it is here),
the second-order dominance test would also be applied.
The second-order dominance test is based on the distribution of cumulative income
across the population proportion. The standard Lorenz curve compares relative disparities
between distributions. The generalized Lorenz curve incorporates diﬀerences in the levels
of income, not just dispersion, and normalizing the generalized Lorenz curve by its mean
gives the standard (relative) Lorenz curve. If the generalized Lorenz curves of the two
income distributions do not intersect, than it can be concluded that welfare in one year
was higher than in the other. Similarly with a comparison of the standard Lorenz curves,
again implications to social welfare are conclusive only if the curves do not intersect.
2These properties include; anonymity, population principle, principle of transfers, monotonicity, scale
independence and decomposability. For details see (Cowell 2000)
3The principle of transfers states that a transfer from a non-poor to a poor individual improves social
welfare while a transfer from a poor individual to an even poorer individual does not.
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In addition to these two tests, there are the Absolute and Relative Dominance tests.
For these tests, if the social welfare functions are limited to those that have the additional
property that proportional increases in all incomes yield welfare improvements, then it
can be concluded that one distribution dominates another if and only if there is Lorenz-
dominance and the mean the dominating distribution has a higher mean than the other
distribution. This would imply that the distributions did not cross for both Lorenz and
generalized Lorenz dominance, with the more equal distribution having the higher mean.
If in addition we have the property that uniform absolute increases in all incomes yield wel-
fare improvements, then there is also Absolute Lorenz Dominance. This implies uniform
absolute increases in all incomes result in welfare improvements.
An alternative to dominance-order tests are summary measures such as inequality in-
dices which represent the degree of dispersion in a single number. This can be particularly
useful when dominance tests are inconclusive.
4.2 Inequality indices
Summary measures of inequality are calculated based on the Generalized Entropy measure
and the Gini coeﬃcient. The Generalized Entropy measure is of the form;
Iθ(x) =
1
θ2 − θ

 1
n(x)



n(x)X
i=1
xi
µ(x)



θ
− 1

 , (1)
where xi is the income for individuals i = 1, ..n, and θ is a parameter reflecting the aversion
to inequality and can take any real value. The Generalized Entropy Measure satisfies
desirable properties of the weak principle of transfers, decomposability, scale independence
and the population principle. For higher positive values of θ the function is more sensitive
to income diﬀerences at the top of the distribution, and for more negative values of θ the
function is more sensitive to diﬀerences at the bottom of the distribution.
The Gini coeﬃcient is a more useful measure since it is not only closely related to
the Lorenz curve, (being the ratio of the area between the Lorenz Curve and the line of
equality and the entire triangle defined by the line of equality) but also has a relatively
easy interpretation of being the average diﬀerence in income between any two randomly
chosen individuals. The Gini coeﬃcient weights income diﬀerences about the mode of the
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distribution greater and hence is not so sensitive to outliers in the tails of the distribution.
The Gini coeﬃcient is defined as;
Gini(x) =
1
2n(x)2µ(x)
n(x)X
i=1
n(x)X
j=1
|xi − xj |, (2)
for individual income xi.
Inequality measures for I−1, Gini coeﬃcient and I2 have been calculated as they are
more sensitive to the bottom, middle (mode) and top, respectively, of the distribution.
4.3 Poverty lines and indices
For this analysis, an absolute and relative approach to measuring poverty was adopted
for both years. For measuring absolute poverty, a poverty line was constructed by costing
a basket of goods and services that provide a minimum standard of living. Individual
dietary intake, based on the survey findings, were used to find a minimum cost food
basket which, in addition to achieving a required calorific level, contained a mixture of
goods which adequately reflected the Kyrgyz diet. In 1993, two baskets, a low-cost and
high-cost basket were developed. The former is a food basket which reflects a more austere
diet and which deviates more from the current consumption pattern of low-income Kyrgyz
than the high-cost (see Popkin (1994) for details). However both food baskets provide the
same level of nutrients and allow for adequate growth and activity. For this analysis we use
the high-cost basket because it reflects a more realistic consumption pattern. The 1993
poverty line was derived by the World Bank, see Popkin (1994), and the 1996 poverty
line was calculated by the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. Severe
poverty was based on half the general poverty line. For 1996, only a per capita poverty
line was calculated and so for purposes of comparison we use the same for 1993. Many
studies, often for cross-country comparative purposes, set a U.S. dollar poverty line, for
example at $4/day/capita, see (Milanovic 1998), or $1/day/capita. However the levels at
which these poverty lines are set tend to be arbitrarily and do not necessarily reflect the
cost of living in the specified country and hence for this reason we apply a relative poverty
line for comparison with results using absolute poverty measures. For relative poverty, a
poverty line at 50% of the median of the income distribution was used. Median rather than
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Table 3: Annual Real and Relative Poverty Lines, per capita, Soms
Absolute Poverty Lines Relative Poverty Lines
(deflated to Nov.’93) Poverty Severe 50% of 60% of 40% of
line Poverty line Median Exp. Median Exp. Median Exp.
1993 1278 639 648 778 519
1996 1136 568 532 639 426
Source: KMPS 1993, NSC 1996
mean income is used since the latter can be heavily influenced by outlying observations if
the distribution is highly skewed. To illustrate how sensitive poverty measures are to this
cut oﬀ, we apply relative poverty lines 10% above and below this cut-oﬀ, and so include a
poverty line at 60% of the median and 40% of the median, and the results for these poverty
lines are presented in Appendix: Household level Welfare, on page 32. The poverty lines
used are illustrated in Table 5. It can be seen from the table that all relative measures lie
below the absolute poverty line (and not the severe poverty line). For 1993, 50% of the
median of the distribution lies above, albeit just, the severe poverty cut-oﬀ, as does the
60% median cut-oﬀ, while 40% of the median lies below the severe poverty line. For 1996
the 60% median cut-oﬀ lies above the severe poverty line, while the 50% and 40% median
cut-oﬀs lie below the severe poverty cut-oﬀ.
We can thus expect trends in the poverty estimates, presented in section 6.3 below to
reflect the relative positions of these poverty lines just described.
The focus of the analysis is individual welfare and so the data is at the individual
level. For comparison, household level analysis of poverty incidences are computed and
are found in Appendix: Household level Welfare, on page 32.
4.3.1 Poverty indices
To get a clear picture of the extent of poverty, it is not enough to just measure the number
of people falling below the poverty line. The number of poor and the distribution of the
poor below the poverty line is important. A widely used measure is the Foster, Greer,
and Thorbecke (1984) measure, (FGT), defined as P (x; z, θ) = 1x(n)
P¡
1− xiz
¢θ
, where
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θ ≥ 0 is the aversion to inequality and the indices have meaningful interpretations as θ
is varied. For θ = 0 the measure counts the number of people falling below the poverty
line, often refered to as the head count measure of poverty, as described in Sen (1976); for
θ = 1, the measure becomes P (x; z, θ) = HIG(x; z), which takes into account the distance
from the poverty line; and at higher values of θ the measure progressively weights heavier
the income of those further from the poverty line. These measures are known as Pθ, and
the head count and income-gap ratio are then P0 and P1, respectively. At θ = ∞, the
measure represents the Rawlsian maximum level of social justice and the well-being of the
poorest person dictates the overall picture of poverty. The actual value of θ that is chosen
is subjective and many empirical studies that use this measure examine how the profile
of poverty changes with changing values of θ. Other than the H and HIG, the other
measures are ‘distribution sensitive’ and may have more desirable policy implications for
targeting in terms of horizontal and vertical equity. For this study we focus on P0, P1
and P2.
5 Data Description
5.1 Overview of the survey
This paper uses nationally representative household survey data for the Kyrgyz Republic,
called the Kyrgyzstan Multipurpose Poverty Surveys (KMPS). The surveys were sponsored
by the World Bank, based on their well-established Living Standard Measurement Study
(LSMS) surveys, see Grosh and Glewwe (1995) for details of the LSMS design. The Kyrgyz
surveys covered approximately 2,000 households and 10,000 individuals in each year, across
the 6 oblasts, Chui, Djalalabad, Issy-kul, Naryn, Osh and Talas as well as the capital,
Bishkek, which is a separate administrative district in the Chui oblast. A stratified multi-
stage sampling procedure was followed so that, in principle, every household had a positive
probability of inclusion into the sample. Approximately two-thirds of the population live
in rural areas and the survey was designed to take this into consideration with the result
that the survey is nationally representative at the level of urban and rural disaggregation.
Both the Fall surveys were carried out during November-January of the respective year,
just after the major harvest period. The seasonality of the survey implies that production
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Table 4: Survey Sample Sizes for KPMS Fall 1993 and Fall 1996
1993 1996
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
Households 1936 828 1108 1948 746 1202
% 42.77 57.23 38.30 61.70
Individuals 9547 3217 6330 8989 2862 6127
% 33.70 66.30 31.84 68.16
Source: KMPS 1993, 1996
figures for agricultural and animal husbandry will be higher than other times during the
year, as will heating costs to a certain extent as the main cold season runs from November
to April. The data are not panel but nationally representative cross-sections.
As is customary in the country’s own survey policy, respondents were paid a nominal
amount for completing the survey. The response rate for the KMPS in 1993 and 1996
were relatively high at 97% for both years. Details of the sample dimensions for the two
years are presented in Table 4.
5.2 Choice of Measure
Consumption expenditure, which is taken as a proxy for permanent income, reflects income
smoothing over what could be periods of fluctuations, or temporary changes, in income.
A proxy for permanent income should also reflect household wealth and this is discussed
later in this section. Fluctuations in income is particularly important in rural or highly
agricultural economies such a found in Central Asia and in particular, the Kyrgyz Republic.
Incomes are derived when the harvest or produce has been sold and depend on the weather
or yield of the crop etc. Non-rural incomes can also be seasonal, e.g. tourism, construction.
This can have important implications in data collection since the reference period in a
survey is typically one month. Another problem is that respondents may under-report
their income, for example fearing they will be reported to the tax authorities if they
report un-declared income. This concerns income such as that from activities in the
informal sector which can often make up a substantial part of total household income and
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is particularly relevant in transition countries where certain activities before were seen as
illegal and are now legal but often informal (i.e. the business is not registered). Problems
of under-reporting of informal activities have been limited to some extent since specific
questions referring to such activities were included in the Survey and respondents were
asked to report income from a variety of activities. However this information may not
reflect the unoﬃcial payments that individuals may earn at work over and above their
oﬃcial salary.
Wage income and social benefits often make up a significant proportion of overall
household income particularly in the FSU countries and subsequent to the start of the
reforms have been subject to severe arrears, with recipients sometimes receiving payment
after months (even years in some cases). Often when paid, workers may be paid in-kind,
in the produce of the enterprise. Although payment is not a monetary value, workers find
their own outlet for selling the goods or barter and hence in-kind payments reflect some
sort of purchasing ability and need to be included. The problem of in-kind payments in
Surveys has been addressed and questions pertaining to expenditure and income issues
request a monetary value for any incomes or expenditures that may be in-kind. Even if
income was correctly reported, fluctuations in rural incomes make expenditure a better
proxy for permanent income, and an expenditure based welfare measure will be used in this
analysis. Throughout the analysis household expenditure may be referred to as household
‘income’ but in all cases (unless explicitly stated) refers to an expenditure based measure.
The calculation of permanent income has drawbacks too. An estimation of permanent
income is based on the sum of all expenditures on nondurables and durable services, and to
calculate the latter needs detailed information often not collected in a household survey.
For this analysis it is felt that the current consumption of non-durables is a less noisy
indicator of welfare than including lumpy expenditure on durables, particularly given that
such information needs to be comparable when looking across years, see Anand and Harris
(1994) which examines the implications when using diﬀerent proxies for welfare.
Another well-known problem with deriving household expenditure is not from inten-
tional under-reporting by the individual (or all household members, depending on the
survey design) but problems of recall. Expenditure which is infrequent, e.g. buying of
clothes or household items, is diﬃcult to estimate when information is collected some time
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after purchase. Studies have shown that items bought two weeks from the survey can
be hard to recall, see Deaton (1997) for a detailed analysis of problems encountered in
household surveys.
A significant component of overall household expenditure is household consumption of
home produced goods. This represents foregone expenditure on goods that a household
would otherwise purchase. The consumption of household produced goods can often be
a significant component of total household expenditure in rural areas. Consuming home
produced goods is not a complete substitute for buying food in the shops, since there is
time and labour spent on producing these goods that could otherwise be spent elsewhere,
but by excluding this component welfare is greatly underestimated. In this analysis the
consumption of home production has been included.
Next we detail the calculation of a household consumption aggregate.
5.3 Derivation of Household Expenditure
Total household aggregate expenditure figures were derived by summing expenditure for
each individual to form an overall household total across the following categories4; food
expenditure, rent and other housing expenditure, including utilities and repair and main-
tenance expenditure, education, health, transportation, private gifts, other expenditure
including clothing, alcohol, holidays and cultural trips, and consumption of household
produced goods. Values have been calculated in terms of monthly figures, or monthly av-
erages where the time unit diﬀered. For this analysis expenditure includes amount spent
on the consumption of home production but does not include expenditure on durables, the
value of livestock assets, imputed rents for home owners or savings in bank accounts. Given
the construction of the household aggregate, these figures refer to the average monthly
expenditures for November 1993 and caution should be shown in interpreting these figures
as a proxy for permanent income.
For the calculation of welfare several observations in both 1993 and 1996 had to be
dropped due to reasons of un-reliability. From the 1993 data set, 68 observations were
dropped; 58 individuals with zero household expenditure and 10 individuals reported a
total household expenditure of less than 1 som a month. From the 1996 data set, one
4Details of the 1993 data are documented in Ackland (1995)
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Table 5: Annual Real Poverty Lines, per capita, Soms
(deflated to Nov.’93) Poverty line Severe Poverty line
1993 1278 639
1996 1136 568
Source: KMPS 1993, NSC 1996
observation from the very top of the distribution was dropped. So for the calculations,
the sample size for 1993 was 9, 479 individuals and for 1996 was 8, 988 individuals.
5.4 Poverty lines
An absolute approach to measuring poverty was adopted for both years, using a poverty
line represented by the cost of a basket of goods and services that provide a minimum
standard of living. Individual dietary intake, based on the survey findings, were used to
find a minimum cost food basket which, in addition to achieving a required calorific level,
contained a mixture of goods which adequately reflected the Kyrgyz diet. In 1993, two
baskets, a low-cost and high-cost basket were developed. The former is a food basket
which reflects a more austere diet and which deviates more from the current consumption
pattern of low-income Kyrgyz than the high-cost (see Popkin (1994) for details). However
both food baskets provide the same level of nutrients and allow for adequate growth and
activity. For this analysis we use the high-cost basket because it reflects a more realistic
consumption pattern. The 1993 poverty line was derived by the World Bank, see Popkin
(1994), and the 1996 poverty line was calculated by the National Statistical Committee
of the Kyrgyz Republic. Severe poverty was based on half the general poverty line. For
1996, only a per capita poverty line was calculated and so for purposes of comparison we
use the same for 1993. The poverty lines used are illustrated in Table 5.
The focus of the analysis is individual welfare and so the data is at the individual level.
For comparison household level analysis is computed for the poverty incidences and are
found in Appendix: Household level Welfare on page 32. The inequality analysis was re-
calculated based on a trimmed distribution, where the bottom 1% and top 1% of incomes
at the top of the distribution were dropped. This was done to see how robust the results
were to measurement error in the tails of the distribution, since there are strong reasons
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Figure 1: Distribution of per capita expenditure, 1993 and 1996
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for suspecting under-reporting at the lower (particularly given the importance of bartering
and the consumption of home produced goods) and top end of the distribution and even
for excluding extremely large (and possibly valid) incomes distorting the overall picture.
This distribution will be referred to as the trimmed distribution.
We now turn to the empirical results.
6 Empirical Results
Overview of the distribution of Income
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of individual income in 1993 and 1996. Between
the two years the income distribution has shifted to the left and there has been an increase
in the population on a lower per capita income. However, the 1996 distribution cuts the
1993 from below implying a fall in the number of people on extremely low incomes. Figure
2 illustrates the distributions normalized by their respective means. It can be seen from
Figure 2 that the majority of the population in both years have an income level less than
the mean and a small percentage of the population on relatively high incomes.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Fig.1 normalized by the mean
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6.1 Welfare Rankings
Initially we first test for first-order dominance for the 1993 and 1996 distributions by look-
ing at the proportion of the population against quantile rankings of income. From Figure
3, also known as the Pen’s Parade, although the 1996 distribution initially dominates the
1993 the first-order dominance criteria is not satisfied as the distributions intersect at the
25th quantile. This provides no conclusive evidence concerning welfare changes and so the
second-order dominance test is applied.
Second-Order dominance is based on the Lorenz and Generalized Lorenz curves. In
the case of the Relative Lorenz Curve in Figure 4, the 1996 distribution is everywhere
above the 1993 distribution, implying that the 1996 distribution is more equal than the
1993 distribution and hence welfare is higher in 1996. However looking at the Gener-
alized Lorenz curves in Figure 5, the 1996 distribution lies above the 1993 distribution
for approximately 70% of the population, after which the 1993 distribution dominates.
The mean of the income distribution is higher in real terms in 1993 and so this distribu-
tion eventually lies above the 1996 distribution. Given these results for the Second-Order
Dominance test, again it cannot be concluded that there has been an improvement in
welfare (notice that since the 1993 distribution has a higher mean, we cannot apply the
Absolute Lorenz dominance result). These results are robust even when the distribution is
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Figure 3: First-Order Dominance: Pen’s Parade
Pen's Parade, 1993 1996
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trimmed, the only change being the Generalized Lorenz curves cross at the 48th quintile
rather than the 47th quintile as in Figure 5. There is no change in the Lorenz curves
when the distributions are trimmed and hence the figure is not provided here. Although
no conclusive evidence that welfare has improved, there has been a fall in inequality and
average income has fallen.
The distributions of income and dominance tests are useful tools in examining the
dispersion of the whole distribution and allows for general conclusions on how the distri-
bution has changed between 1993 and 1996. However these movements do not provide
any conclusive evidence that welfare has improved or fallen over this short period, so we
next turn to summary measures.
Percentile ratios provide summary information about the relative diﬀerences in the
distribution. From the results in Table 6 it can be seen that the disparity in income
between the top 10th and bottom 10th decile has lessened between the three years. This
implies either a fall in income at the top decile or a significant increase of individuals with
income in the bottom 10th decile in 1996. An increase in the percentile ratio between the
10th and the median, and 25th and the median, compared to 1993, indicates either a fall
in mean income or an increase in the income levels of the 25th and 10th deciles. Evidence
from the density distribution suggests that there has been an increase in the proportion
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Figure 4: Second-Order Dominance: Relative Lorenz Curve
Lorenz Curve, 1993 1996
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Figure 5: Second-Order Dominance: Generalized Lorenz Curve
Generalized Lorenz Curve, 1993 1996
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Table 6: Percentile Ratios, 1993 and 1996
p9010 p
10
50 p
25
50
1993 15.22 0.21 0.51
(s.e.) (0.450) (0.005) (0.010)
1996 7.49 0.38 0.59
(s.e.) (0.140) (0.006) (0.007)
Source: Authors own calculations based on KMPS 1993, 1996
Table 7: Percentile Ratios using trimmed distribution
p9010 p
10
50 p
25
50
1993 14.08 0.22 0.52
(s.e.) (0.941) (0.014) (0.015)
1996 7.02 0.39 0.59
(s.e.) (0.096) (0.006) (0.007)
Source: Authors calculations based on KMPS 1993, 1996
of the population on lower incomes, and thus also a fall in mean income, or 50th decile.
The results are robust to the trimmed distribution, as illustrated in Table 7, with little
significant change in the p9010 ratios.
6.2 Inequality Measurement
The distribution is broken down into urban and rural populations since living standards
tend to be very diﬀerent between the two areas, with two-thirds of the population living
in the generally less developed rural areas.
It can be seen from Table 8 that there has been a fall in I−1 and in the Gini coeﬃcient,
reflecting a narrowing of income diﬀerences in the bottom and near the mode of the
distribution. There has been a significant decline in disparity in rural areas at the lower
end of the distribution, with I−1 falling to 0.42 from 2.08 in rural areas. Diﬀerences at
the top of the distribution have increased, reflected in a higher I2 in 1996, increasing from
0.46 to 0.55 in 1996 for the whole population. This result is not robust to trimming in the
top tail of the distribution (unlike the result for the percentile ratio p9010 which is robust to
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Table 8: Inequality Indices, 1993 and 1996
I−1 Gini I2
1993 1996 1993 1996 1993 1996
Total population 1.83 0.44 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.55
(s.e) (0.121) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.540)
Urban 0.72 0.40 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.49
(s.e) (0.054) (0.021) (0.004) (0.008) (0.015) (0.069)
Rural 2.08 0.42 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.53
(s.e) (0.159) (0.021) (0.003) (0.011) (0.009) (1.006)
Source: Author’s calculations based on KMPS 1993, 1996
Table 9: Inequality Indicies using trimmed distribution
I−1 Gini I2
1993 1996 1993 1996 1993 1996
Total population 0.86 0.35 0.46 0.41 0.40 0.27
(s.e) (0.050) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Urban 0.66 0.29 0.41 0.36 0.29 0.25
(s.e) (0.062) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.014) (0.008)
Rural 0.93 0.34 0.47 0.41 0.43 0.39
(s.e) (0.064) (0.007) (0.020) (0.003) (0.020) (0.010)
Source: Author’s calculations based on KMPS 1993, 1996
trimming in the distribution and again shows an increase in disparity in the distribution
between 1993 and 1996). The indices for the trimmed distribution are presented in Table
9. The I2 measure in fact shows a decrease in 1996, when the top 1% of incomes are
dropped. This suggests that there are a few particularly high incomes in the top tail.
However, all other results are consistent with the 1996 indices being lower than in 1993.
For all cases, in both the full and trimmed distributions, rural inequality remains higher
than urban inequality.
The results of the inequality indices show that inequality has decreased over 1993 and
1996, with even a relatively significant fall in mean income. There appears to be a highly
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skewed distribution in 1996, with individuals at the very top 1% of the distribution having
a much higher income than incomes up to the 98 percentile. With such disparity at the
top of the distribution focusing on one index such as the I2 could be misleading. It is noted
that incomes at the very bottom of the distribution, particularly for those individuals near,
or at, subsistence living, are subject to problems of measurement error. The unreliability
of the incomes at the lower tail can be seen by the relatively large standard errors for 1993
for I−1, especially for rural areas. However dropping observations that seem unreliable at
the lower tail can alter the result and hence the results are not robust to trimming at the
bottom of the distribution.
6.3 Poverty Measurement
This section focuses on the depth of poverty. The population is decomposed into urban
and rural areas as well as by oblast, as this level of poverty analysis is more informative
when examining aspects of poverty.
From Table 10 it can be seen that the incidence of poverty has increased slightly
between 1993 and 1996 with the head count rate, P0, increasing from 49% to 52% of
the population. The head count figures for 1993, are on average four percentage points
higher than those found in Ackland and Falkingham (1996), with the trend for urban and
rural being the same. The values for P2 fall substantially for both years. This implies
that the proportion of individuals nearer the poverty line are greater than those near the
very bottom of the income distribution and hence the extent of the deprivation is less in
1996. There has been only a marginal increase in urban poverty, with a higher increase
of 4 percentage points in rural areas. However, the incidence of severe poverty has fallen
by 4% for the population as a whole and in both urban and rural areas. Interestingly
the fall in severe poverty has been greater in rural areas. This may be due to economic
improvements in the economy by 1996 (wage arrears were significantly lower in 1996
compared to 1993, see (Namazie 2001c)) as well as households being able to cope better
with the new environment. Except for the head count measures, for higher values of θ
(higher θ reflects increasing weight of incomes further away from the poverty line, hence
those worse oﬀ) the poverty measures have fallen. The poverty indices have decreased
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Table 10: Poverty Measures (per capita), 1993 and 1996
P0 P1 P2
Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor
1993
Total Pop. 0.49 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.16 0.08
(s.e) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Urban 0.33 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.03
(s.e) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Rural 0.57 0.30 0.30 0.15 0.20 0.10
(s.e) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1996
Total Pop. 0.52 0.20 0.22 0.06 0.12 0.03
(s.e) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Urban 0.34 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.01
(s.e) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Rural 0.61 0.25 0.27 0.07 0.15 0.03
(s.e) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Source: Author’s own calculations based on KMPS 1993, 1996
relatively more in rural compared to urban areas, though the absolute values are higher
for rural areas across all values of θ.
Diﬀerences across oblast were quite varied. In 1993 there were only a few percentage
point diﬀerences in poverty incidences across oblasts, except for Issy-kul and Djlala-abad
where diﬀerences were as much as 4% and 7% lower, respectively. In 1996 the diﬀerences
were much larger, ranging from 3% to 8% across all oblasts except Bishkek (which did not
change), for P1. Larger family sizes particularly for families at the bottom of the ‘income’
distribution imply a greater proportion of people than households in poverty. The figures
for poverty incidence at the household level are a couple of percentage points lower than
the per capita figures, 43% in 1993 and 45% in 1996. This is expected due to the relatively
large household sizes which averaged 4.9 persons in 1993 and 4.6 persons in 1996, see Table
13, Table 14 and Table 15 for the breakdown of poverty incidences at the household level,
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Table 11: Poverty Measures (per capita) by Oblast, 1993
1993
P0 P1 P2
Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor
North
Bishkek 0.22 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.01
(s.e.) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Chu 0.38 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.04
(s.e.) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Issykul 0.54 0.31 0.29 0.16 0.20 0.11
(s.e.) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
Naryn 0.64 0.39 0.37 0.19 0.25 0.11
(s.e.) (0.026) (0.023) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009)
Talas 0.47 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.16 0.08
(s.e) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
South
Djalabad 0.59 0.34 0.33 0.16 0.22 0.10
(s.e.) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Osh 0.55 0.27 0.28 0.14 0.18 0.09
(s.e.) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Source: Author’s own calculations based on KMPS 1993, 1996
in Appendix 8 on page 32. This shows how diﬀerent the picture of poverty can be when
not accounting for diﬀerences in household size.
Tables 11 and 12 present poverty rates across oblasts. Looking at figures for 1993,
poverty rates are quite high in 1993 across all oblasts except Chui and Bishkek, although
Chui had a rate much higher than Bishkek at 38% compared to 22% of the population.
For the rest of the country the figures were quite high ranging from 47% for Talas, to 64%
for Naryn. From Table 12, in 1996 poverty actually fell in Chu but increased across all
other oblasts except Bishkek, which remained constant between the two years. Poverty
increased from 64% to 71% in Naryn, in the North, while in the South both Djalabad
and Osh experienced an increase in poverty from 59% and 55% respectively to 66% in
each oblast. Osh is the second largest city in the Kyrgyz Republic and highly urban,
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Table 12: Poverty Measures (per capita) by Oblast, 1996
1996
P0 P1 P2
Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor
North
Bishkek 0.22 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01
(s.e.) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Chu 0.31 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.01
(s.e.) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Issykul 0.56 0.18 0.22 0.05 0.11 0.02
(s.e.) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002)
Naryn 0.71 0.29 0.31 0.09 0.18 0.04
(s.e.) (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
Talas 0.52 0.26 0.21 0.07 0.12 0.02
(s.e) (0.025) (0.021) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003)
South
Djalabad 0.66 0.28 0.29 0.09 0.16 0.04
(s.e.) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Osh 0.66 0.26 0.29 0.09 0.16 0.04
(s.e.) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Source: Author’s own calculations based on KMPS 1996
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illustrating that not only rural areas experienced increases in poverty. Interestingly in
all oblasts except Talas, there was a fall in severe poverty compared to levels in 1993, the
falls ranged from 6% of the population in Bishkek to as much as 34% in Djalabad and
37% in Naryn. For P1 and P2 the trends are the same, but the absolute values decrease
with increasing θ. Also the fall in rates for those experiencing severe poverty suggest that
although there has be a higher proportion of individuals falling into poverty, the numbers
falling to much lower levels of income has decreased.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented aspects of welfare to see what impact the reform had over the rela-
tively short period 1993-1996 on the population of the Kyrgyz Republic. The main finding
is that there is no conclusive evidence that welfare has increased over this period, since
although there has been a decrease in inequality in the income (consumption expenditure)
distribution average income has fallen. The fall in income has lead to an increase in the
incidence of poverty though severe poverty rates have fallen. This suggests that more
people are being pushed into poverty and those at the bottom of the distribution have not
experienced a fall in living standards.
Average income has fallen across the population but appears to have increased for those
at the very bottom of the distribution. Inequality has fallen over the period, even in urban
and rural areas, but using a measure that focuses on the bottom tail of the distribution,
inequality has increased. This result is not robust to trimming of the top and bottom 1%
of the income distribution, with inequality decreasing for all measures, in urban and rural
areas. The fall in inequality in rural areas is much smaller using a trimmed distribution
and illustrates how data at the top and bottom of the distribution can alter the picture.
Large expenditures at the top of the distribution can well be valid particularly since there
were improvements in the economy in 1996. The reduction in inequality at the lower
end of the distribution is a reflection of how diﬃcult it can be to calculate expenditure,
particularly in a rural economy, where a large source of consumption is based on home
produced goods which are diﬃcult to price. Also in 1993 inflation was over 1000% at the
end of the year and wage arrears eﬀected almost 60% of workers falling to around 24% in
1996, see Namazie (2001b).
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Although poverty has increased over this period from 49% to 52%, there has been a
fall in severe poverty, again seen in the fall in mean income across the population but
accompanied by a shift to the right of the income distribution. Measures show that
the rural population is poorer in both years than the urban population. Interestingly, a
breakdown of poverty incidences by oblast show that the urban city of Osh has the highest
incidence of poverty, followed by other rural oblasts of Naryn, Talas and Djalabad.
This paper has also illustrated the importance of looking at inequality and poverty
measures that are distribution sensitive to get a clearer picture of how the distribution of
income has changed. It also highlights how outliers in the tails of the distribution can alter
results and the importance of examining how robust results are to potential measurement
error. So although over the period the transition process may have lead to an increase in
those poor, those already poor were not made worse of and this is comparable to results
in other studies on the Kyrgyz Republic, that the worst eﬀects of the transition process
are over. Nevertheless panel data would be needed to be able to conclude to what extent
poverty has been chronic or transient, and for which groups of the population.
When more data becomes available future research could be carried out to assess how
robust these findings are to changes in the poverty line as well as seeing how trends in
inequality and poverty change across the years. The findings presented here are greatly
aﬀected by the labour market since labour market activity has such an impact on household
and individual income. The aﬀect of reform on the labour market, both in terms of labour
demand and labour supply considerations, are discussed in Namazie (2001d), Namazie
(2001c) and Namazie (2001a). Drawbacks to measures of welfare in such as rural economy
in the light of hyperinflation, wage arrears and prevalence of bartering have been mentioned
and Namazie and Sanfey (2001) examines well-being based on a non-monetary measure
of welfare to see if a subjective measure of welfare oﬀers information complementary to
conventional monetary based measures.
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8 Appendix: Household level welfare
Poverty rates at the Household Level
Table 13: Poverty Measures (household level), 1993 and 1996
P0 P1 P2
Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor
1993
Total Pop. 0.43 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.14 0.06
(s.e.) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Urban 0.31 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.03
(s.e.) (0.016) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Rural 0.53 0.28 0.28 0.14 0.19 0.09
(s.e.) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
1996
Total Pop. 0.45 0.16 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.02
(s.e.) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Urban 0.28 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.01
(s.e.) (0.017) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Rural 0.55 0.21 0.23 0.06 0.13 0.03
(s.e.) (0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Source: Author’s own calculations based on KMPS 1993, 1996
32
Table 14: Poverty Measures (household level) by Oblasts, 1993
1993
P0 P1 P2
Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor
North
Bishkek 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.02
(s.e.) (0.022) (0.015) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Chu 0.37 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.05
(s.e.) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Issykul 0.50 0.29 0.26 0.14 0.18 0.10
(s.e.) (0.036) (0.032) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
Naryn 0.62 0.36 0.35 0.17 0.23 0.11
(s.e.) (0.054) (0.052) (0.036) (0.028) (0.030) (0.021)
Talas 0.46 0.21 0.22 0.11 0.14 0.07
(s.e.) (0.052) (0.040) (0.033) (0.025) (0.027) (0.018)
South
Djalabad 0.52 0.29 0.28 0.13 0.18 0.08
(s.e.) (0.034) (0.032) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012)
Osh 0.53 0.25 0.26 0.13 0.17 0.09
(s.e.) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
Source: Author’s own calculations based on KMPS 1993
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Table 15: Poverty Measures (household level) by Oblasts, 1996
1996
P0 P1 P2
Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor Poor Very Poor
North
Bishkek 0.20 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.004
(s.e.) (0.021) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Chu 0.27 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.005
(s.e.) (0.023) (0.013) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
Issykul 0.48 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.09 0.01
(s.e.) (0.037) (0.025) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.004)
Naryn 0.65 0.26 0.28 0.08 0.15 0.04
(s.e.) (0.044) (0.040) (0.026) (0.016) (0.019) (0.010)
Talas 0.45 0.21 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.02
(s.e.) (0.056) (0.045) (0.029) (0.014) (0.018) (0.006)
South
Djalabad 0.58 0.25 0.25 0.07 0.14 0.03
(s.e.) (0.031) (0.025) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006)
Osh 0.63 0.24 0.27 0.08 0.15 0.04
(s.e.) (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004)
Source: Author’s own calculations based on KMPS 1996
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